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Natural Law and Justice. Lloyd L. Weinreb. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1987. 320 pp. Reviewed by Peter P. Cvek., St. Peter's 
College. 
In the twentieth century, the concept of natural law refers to a 
particular philosophy of law in the general area of jurisprudence. In this 
context, contemporary theories of natural law are collectively defined in 
terms of their opposition is typically said to revolve around the correct 
understanding of the relationship between law and morals. Natural law 
maintains that genuine positive laws must conform to the principles of 
morality. Since the purpose of both law and morality is to promote the 
common good, this conformity is the primary cause of any laws obligatory 
force. Legal obligation is thus a subset of moral obligation. The major 
implication of natural law theory is succinctly captured by the Thomistic 
declaration which states that a law which is judged to be immoral is not a 
law, but a perversion of law. In contrast, legal positivism insists on the 
autonomy of law, or the separation of law and morals. Positive laws are 
identified by criteria of legal legitimacy that are not themselves moral 
requirements. These laws may or may not conform to the dictates of 
morality, nevertheless, they are still laws, and hence legally binding. 
Although one's moral obligations are distinct from one's legal obligations, 
for moral reasons, one might choose not to obey a law which one judged to 
be immoral. 
Professor Weinreb's Natural Law and Justice begins with a 
simple observation about the current state of jurisprudence. "Considered 
on its own terms, the contemporary debate has a curiously arid quality..." 
(4). Does it really make a difference, he asks, whether we say, along with 
the proponent of natural law. This enactment is too immoral to obligate 
us; therefore it is not a law," or, as the legal positivist would have it, "This 
law is too immoral to obligate us; therefore, it ought not be obeyed"? 
Weinreb summarily concludes that the difference has little practical 
value. In fact, he suggests that contemporary natural law and legal 
positivism have more in common than is typically supposed. Most 
importantly, both theories deny any normative significance to the causal 
order of nature. In the contemporary context, both natural law and legal 
positivism assume the distinction between "is" and "ought," between 
descriptive laws of nature and normative principles, or, on another level, 
between positive law and morality. Commenting on the contemporary 
"deontological" version of natural law, Weinreb asserts that "although its 
various formulations have important points to make, they establish 
nothing that is not compatible with legal positivism and contained 
misleadingly within it." (8) 
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In light of these common features, Weinreb suggests that "the 
persistence of natural law in its present guise is itself a puzzle and an 
indication that something more lies hidden beneath the jurisprudential 
debate." (8) The purpose of this book is to reveal this something which lies 
hidden, a purpose that can be achieved only by an examination of the 
history and original character of natural law. Because in its classical-
ontological form, natural law directly confronted the fundamental problem 
of responsible human freedom in a causally determined universe. The 
aim of classical natural law was to explain how a human being can be part 
of the causally determined natural order and still be a free and morally 
responsible agent. Since moral responsibility seems to require that an act 
be both free and determined at the same time, the problem is contained 
within the very idea of freedom itself. On the one hand, unless a person's 
act is free and self-determined, one cannot be said to be morally 
responsible for it. On the other hand, unless the circumstances and 
personal qualities which make one act as one does are determinate, the 
act appears as a the result of an arbitrary occurrence and not something 
for which one could be responsible. Yet, if circumstances and personal 
qualities do determine one's act, then it is not free and one is not morally 
responsible. So, in order for a person to act freely and responsibly, then 
the act must be determined, but if it is determined, then it cannot be free 
(6). 
For contemporary natural law, the issue is merely to explain one's 
obligation to obey the law. This limiting of the problem is a direct result of 
the rejection of classical-ontological natural law and its replacement by a 
new deontological formulation. This is not to say that the problem 
addressed by classical natural law has been resolved. Quite the contrary, 
the problem remains, albeit under new names and within different 
conceptual frameworks. Weinreb curtly dismisses the contemporary 
philosophical discussions of the problem as irrelevant, since they amount 
to either simple acts of conceptual clarification or merely verbal 
reformulations of the problem. Accordingly, Weinreb intends to restore 
"the original understanding of natural law as a theory about the nature of 
being, the human condition in particular" (7). 
This project of restoration is divided into two parts, each with its 
own distinctive strategy. Part One is essentially a brief history of the 
natural law tradition from its beginnings in ancient Greek speculation 
about the Kostnos to the present deontological theories. Although the 
idea of a natural law as such first appears in Cicero's Latin translations of 
Greek Stoicism, its sources lie in the earliest stages of Greek reflection on 
the human condition. Chapter 1 introduces the original ontological 
understanding of natural law as it appears in Home, the Greek tragic 
poets, the nose-physis debate, Plate, Aristotle, and the Stoics. The classical 
solution to the problem was contained in the idea of a unitary normative 
natural order within which human beings are simultaneously free and 
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determined. From an internal perspective, even though one's acts are free 
and self-determined, they fulfill the cosmic order. From an external 
perspective, one's acts are determined, nevertheless, what occurs is 
subject to personal responsibility. Within the natural order, everything is 
as it ought to be and ought to be as it is. 
Chapter 2 follows the course of natural law in Roman 
jurisprudence and the theological doctrines of early Christianity. The 
chapter concludes with an extended discussion of the philosophy of 
natural law expounded by Thomas Aquinas. For Aquinas, the natural law 
is the divine Eternal Law immanent in the created order of nature. While 
all creatures are necessarily determined by nature, rational beings possess 
the power of self-determination. Yet, in acting in obedience to the natural 
law, they likewise fulfill the Eternal Law and the order of all things as 
determined by divine providence. 
Chapter 3 examines the use of natural law in the political 
philosophies of Hobbes, Locke, and Rosseau. In its modern development, 
natural law, separated from its theological and ontological roots, became 
"an isolated abstraction," which continued to affirm that nature set 
standards of conduct, without explaining what nature was or why it was 
normative. As illustrated by the modern contractarians, "natural law 
persisted, the more easily because there was nothing to limit its specific 
content," and it could be used to identify whatever each theorist believed 
to be fundamental, that is, certain, self-evident, and non-negotiable (2). 
The chapter concludes with the critical philosophy of Kant, who attempted 
to reconstruct a natural law on a rational foundation, without recourse to 
the old metaphysics of nature. 
Chapter 4 reviews the contemporary deontological theories of 
natural law as found in the conception of "practical reasonableness" 
advocated by John Finnis, in David Richards' "methodological natural 
law," and suggestively in Ronald Dworkin's theory of "law as integrity." 
John Finnis' new natural law theory is the best example of the 
contemporary Kantian-inspired theories of natural law and is well worth a 
close examination. 
Part Two pursues the same goal of restoration by a critique of 
contemporary political philosophy. Specifically, chapters 5 through 8 
examine the current analysis of the normative ideas of liberty, equality, 
and justice, which are said to be the principles of a just social order. 
Weinreb persuasively argues that the project of contemporary political 
philosophy is hopeless. Since these concepts have been divorced from 
nature, they are effectively without content. What content they do possess 
is typically based on an unvalidated conception of the self and various 
reconstituted conventional beliefs. Although many of thee comments are 
reminiscent of the recent communitarian critiques of liberal political 
theory, Weinreb criticizes communitarianism for similar shortcomings. 
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For Weinreb, however, the concepts of contemporary political 
philosophy are important because they are analogues for the basic 
problematic of classical natural law. Weinreb argues that there is a 
connection, at least by analogy, between the ontological natural law and 
contemporary normative issues. The classical idea of natural law sought to 
mediate the opposition between freedom and determinism within a 
normative natural orders. Analogously, the idea of justice, with respect to 
the individual, attempts to reconcile the ideas of desert and entitlement. 
Desert presupposes freedom and responsibility, whereas entitlement is 
based on the application of a determinate rule. Although justice would 
require that persons get what they deserve and deserve what they get, the 
divergence between desert and entitlement, like that of freedom and 
determinism, is inherent and unavoidable. Similarly, social justice 
replaces the ideas of desert and entitlement with the ideas of liberty and 
equality. Liberty defines a person's capacity for self-determination 
according to the law. Equality is effected by the laws granting of 
entitlements which attempt to eliminate or disregard natural differences, 
not to mention, different uses of the capacity for self-determination. 
Unfortunately, liberty and equality are similarly inconsistent. "Abstractly, 
every principle of liberty or equality is contradicted by another principle no 
less powerful than itself. A just social order, in which liberty and equality 
coexist without contradiction of the principle prescribed by each, is 
unattainable." (10) The antinomies of justice are insoluble because their 
source, concealed by contemporary political discourse, is the age old 
ontological antinomy between freedom and determinism. 
What distinguishes Weinreb's otherwise standard history of 
natural law is his attempt to restore the ontological impetus which has 
propelled the natural law tradition throughout its development. Yet, it is 
not clear what this restoration is meant to accomplish. Weinreb concedes 
that the solution proposed by the classical-ontological account is incorrect, 
or at least, unacceptable to the modern mind. The distinction between 
ontology and morality is readily acknowledged by both contemporary 
deontological natural law and legal positivism. Weinreb's claim that 
modern political philosophy is ultimately infected by the same, until now 
undiagnosed, disease is provocative and may not be far off the mark. 
Tragically, it appears to be a disease for which there is not cure. One is 
reminded of Alasdair Maclntyre's similarly dismal appraisal of the history 
of western ethics in After Virtua (1981). It is not evident that Weinreb is 
waiting for another St. Benedict, let alone another Thomas Aquinas. 
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Excesses, Alphonso Lingis, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1983). ISBN 0-87395-797-
0. Reviewed by Benjamin S. Pryor v Claremont Graduate School. 
Books in philosophy almost always lack one important thing: 
pictures. Unguis' Excesses, a sort of "On the Road" for academics, has 
some pictures and a surplus of conviction which makes the book both 
unnerving and satisfying. Excesses is full of strikingly clear explanation of 
everything from Aristotle to Lacan, making it valuable to anyone wishing to 
understand these philosophers, our culture, and the trouble our particular 
form of civilization has with what is not civilized. Lingis sets out not to 
explain, but to discover "the excessive impulses of our eroticism in new 
ways, in remote places." He does this by offering both a fascinating first 
person narrative of his adventures under water, in East Africa, India, Bali, 
New Guinea, and Sri Lanka, and their arrangement in counterpoint with 
strangely consistent and illuminating analyses of Freud, Lacan, Kant, 
Aristotle, and others. But he does not fall back on the philosophers, but 
instead lets their observations on civilization, law, and excess both 
elucidate and fall short of that which they purport to explain. By this 
constant uneasy dialogue between our culture as represented by Freud, 
Kant, Aristotle, et al., and ones which it cannot begin to understand, we 
begin to learn something about our own ways of thinking with respect to 
our dealings with alterity. Lingis does not conceal outrage at civilizations' 
violent encounter with the savage, with what does not belong to it, or at the 
economic and political philosophizing that justifies its actions to itself. 
This is what makes the book primarily ethical in tone and point of view. 
Excesses begins and ends with a question of ethics. We are from the 
beginning confronted with the dismantling of the integrated ego, and the 
violent expenditure of excess libidinal energy, expenditure without return, 
the compulsion to "unreasonably spend weeks to cross Afghanistan to 
go...look at some dust covered ruins." But between the dissembling of the 
self and this violence arises the question of community and culture, the 
problem of how we are to live together when the manifestations of excess 
take completely alien forms. Excesses manages to explore this question 
through the confrontation of 'western' manifestations of excess and the 
"savage", or what occupies the place of the inaccessible and shocking 
other. Through the dismemberment of the self which inaugurates our trek 
to the gradual reconstruction of the individual in a far away place, we get a 
picture of what it would be like to live in a world. 
We first follow Lingis into the sea, a world in which we are 
powerless, and in which excess is stripped bare. The question of a 
consciousness which grasps and orders is rendered null, and the question 
of erotic excess becomes pressing. Colorful and dangerous fish swimming 
in darkness present a display over and beyond the function of camouflage 
and the semantic functions of mating signals, in terms of which we are 
usually asked to understand living things. But if these explanations fail, 
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then what exactly are the colors illuminated by the fish's own 
biolumnescense for the benefit of nobody and nothing? They are there for 
the benefit of the eye adrift in the deep which passes over surface effects, 
which caresses. For us, the crux of this observation is that the eye is not 
being operated by an ego for its intents and purposes. It is being moved 
by the movements it provokes in the other without apprehending or 
appropriating what it sees. 
So much of the rest of the book is dominated by this 
dismemberment of the integrated body that another question presents 
itself: how can the explorations of excess in cultural avoid, if only out of 
anxiety, codification, circumscription, or assimilation of the forms of excess 
we discover? The answer, here and elsewhere, lies in the "transgressive" 
nature of the writing itself, in the constant confrontation of one discourse 
with another without any therapeutic intent. The encounters throughout 
the book are not between reason and savagery, though we get plenty of 
charged descriptions of what happens when encounters are self-
understood in this way. They are encounters between different 
manifestations of excess, from within the traveller's manifestation of 
excess. 
The initial dismemberment of the ego prepares us, along with 
Lingis, to approach others in a new way, unmasked to an extent. 
Interestingly, the second chapter, "Savages" begins with an extended 
quote which shows how encounters go when the ego is well in place, but 
because the quotation runs for a page and a half, it's easy to mistake the 
speaker for Lingis, and to feel betrayed. For our culture, the scarifications 
and bodily mutilations of the savage are so many signs waiting for a 
rational interpretation. And the inadequacy of explaining savage 
inscriptions in terms of their references, of unearthing their semantic 
functions, might lead us to simply declare the savage incomprehensible, 
or entirely other. Or worse, it might lead us to explain the inscriptions 
anyway, in terms of primitive intentional gestures, perhaps. But, Lingis 
points out, this never explains the repugnance we feel over the savagery of 
it all (which, he'll say alter, adumbrates our response to it). Of course, he 
ways, the issue is sex, but it is also cruelty: 
They use their own flesh as so much material at hand for-
-what? We hardly know how to characterize it—Art? 
Inscription? Sign-language?....Aren't they treating 
themselves like pieces of dikdik fur, bat's penis...? All 
that excites some dark dregs of lechery and cruelty in us, 
holding our eyes fixed with repugnance and lust (p. 22). 
Lingis begins, instead of with concepts of intentions and sensations, by 
working with psychoanalytic concepts, such as excitation: that which 
occurs in the "physioco-chemical mass of material nature when there is an 
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effect disproportionate to its cause." Lingis takes things from the "libidinal 
point of view/ and describes libidinal life, the moment when force 
intensifies, when a surplus builds. This is excess as we have come to 
understand it, and it is all surface rather than the depth of inward life: 
The savage inscription is a working over the skin, all 
surface effects. This cutting in orifices and raising 
tumescences does not contrive new receptor organs for 
the depth body, nor multiply ever more subtle signs for 
the psychic depth where personal intentions would be 
being formed; it extends the erotogenic surface (p. 34). 
This kind of resolution, an understanding that refuses to appropriate or 
confront is repeated throughout the book and elaborated clearly and 
forcefully. 
The question of eroticism in culture leads to a new set of issues, 
raised in the interstice between Plato and Freud, between their theories of 
sublimation. For Plato, eroticism moves from individuality along the 
vertical axis to sublime universality and generality, and this in turn 
animates human activity: 
...eros is the purposive in general. It is erotic force in 
every human operation that animates it with teleology, 
with a longing for the beyond. Then, paradoxically, it is 
philosophical dialectics that is the apt method to know 
the true nature of sensual lust (p. 51). 
The Platonic sublimation of intimacy in favor of generality, of the most 
universal, is echoed in Freud, but minus the teleology. Freud discovers the 
erotic behind the striving for justice and knowledge, and the attachment to 
beauty. But he does not see sublimation as an ascension to the world of 
the forms, but as the result of repression: 
It is because the originally wild, unbound sexual 
attachment of the infant is repressed that it seeks outlets 
in the sublime forms of a search for knowledge, a striving 
after just, that is, fraternal and loving, society, and 
longing for beauty, that is, universal or culturally 
acceptable phantasms. The ultimate metaphysical 
oneness and wholeness the erotically driven life seeks is 
the unavowable intimacy of the infantile condition prior 
to all culture (p. 53). 
The initial impulse, while for Plato finds its home in unity and universality, 
for Freud is alienated into the fragmented and impermanent forms of 
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culture and social organization. The fascination with bestiality and other 
excessive and transgressive sexual acts is merely the "inventive libido" 
seeking its own norm beyond what is presented to it as proper satisfaction 
of its immediate needs. In a culture constituted by repression and 
sublimation, the libido "will always contain the urge to go farther." 
High culture does not represent the ever more rich satisfaction of 
man's protean desiring nature but the ever more extensive dissimulation 
of its demand. As eros becomes ever more universal, and, in civilization, 
every more conscious and capable, it turns ever more into a discontent (p. 
56) So what else is there? The story of Freudian repression in civilization is 
a familiar one, and is here given the most clear of expositions, but for a 
purpose that is not merely expository. What if, Lingis asks, and this is the 
ethical question of the book, there is simply no other way of thinking about 
human life on this planet? The temple of Khajuraho is the first of a few 
examples that shows that there is. The temple as he describes it is liberally 
decorated on friezes in its intricately assembled geometrical buildings with 
erotic images: auto-erotic stimulation, homosexual and bestial intercourse, 
and so on. But these images do not give Lingis the sense that they are 
provocative or that they record the violation of taboo. Instead, the Platonic 
telos and the erotic drive are no longer capable of being put at opposite 
ends of a vertical expanse, or of being thought of in terms of Freudian 
repression, but are fully contained within human sensuality: 
...here craft, engineering, architecture, social 
organization, mathematical intelligence, religious 
mysticism were not advances beyond, nor detours form, 
but new heights and realms for eroticism. These are not 
temples of love in that the culture knew nothing higher to 
enshrine than biological functions; they are temples in 
which sensuality itself reaches a supreme degree of 
intelligence, thoughtfulness, beauty, capable of entering 
into or assembling the cosmos (p. 61). 
The possibility of such a culture, of such a form of reason, is both 
encouraging and confrontational, if only to see what is more true to us be 
most unthinkable to another. 
The confrontational nature of this chapter is magnified in the 
next, in which we encounter a form of excess which is pure expenditure, 
"solar". Whereas our only encounter in Khajuraho was with a culture long 
dead, we are now confronted with one that it dying. Lingis begins with a 
description of the Balinese dance in which entranced men gore 
themselves with daggers. For us, obsessed with teleology and 
enlightenment as we are, the dance aroused a host of interpretations 
which inevitably become "an integral part of an enterprise of destruction 
of any culture (83)." But instead of finding demented collapse which 
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transports the dancer upward to inhuman universality, and instead of 
finding "psychological theater" which exorcises the participant, frees him 
to invoke what exceeds and underlies the "special economy" of culture and 
morality, Lingis discovers "pure theater": 
...[the] enterprise of theoretical consolation [which 
promises a cure, postpones the end] is an illusory fixation 
of forms to cover over the uncontainable forces of 
universal transience. Theatrical or tragic culture is 
contrived to bring about inward union with the universal 
will. The consolation it gives...is to find enkindled in one's 
heart the pleasure which is that of the universal 
substance—not a contentment in the stabilization of 
forms, in immortality, but an exaltation in the ceaseless 
formation and transformation of forms. In this ecstasy 
alone there is reconciliation with the imminent 
destruction of our own form (p. 84). 
If this rethinking of the Balinese trance questions our mode of 
explanation and its imposition, the next chapter, "Black Gods", advances 
this one step further. Freudian theory accepts as a grounding supposition 
that "civilization is constituted out of the prohibition of immediate 
gratification." And for one who doesn't look closely enough, cannibalistic 
societies of new Guinea are as constituted by repression as any other, the 
difference being only in the level of sophistication, of civilization in 
evidence there. Their civilization is merely society in its most primitive 
form. Lingis, however, effectively argues, and this is as close to an 
argument as Excesses comes, that this explanation of headhunting society 
is at least questionable. He does so by snowing that headhunting is not a 
passage from the demand for immediate gratification to the alienation of 
that demand into the world of the real, into symbols, and therefore into 
generality. Instead, headhunting and cannibalism singularize: 
The cannibalism would then not be a eucharist which 
founds a legislated association, the pact of a 
brotherhood, would not be a participation in the mystical 
body of the idealized father which puts the legislator of 
the universal law in each one; it is a singularizing 
initiation by which one that has killed one of his own kind 
removes himself from the codes of association. The 
world that now speaks in him is not the imperative of 
discourse which prohibits immediate gratification, 
addresses the libido to the other and regulates its 
articulation into multiple ways of symbolism; it is rather 
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the breath and the power, the spirit, that issues the war-
cry (p. 107-108). 
We are no longer able to see the ritualistic battles as some tropic variation 
on what we all do. From the point of view of civilization, of our culture, they 
cannot be truly understood without also being civilized. From the point of 
view of the libido, from which Lingis constantly tries to write, they are 
distinctly other, and understood as such. 
In the last two chapters, Lingis seems to reach for reconciliation 
through respect for others, manifested by the use of the second person 
"you" when addressing those he meets. Excess is still present, but, 
particularly in the final chapter, as an excess of virtue, of generosity, which 
is uncalled for by the Kantian imperative, and by the measured and equal 
exchange that Aristotle sees as constitutive of civilization. In the last 
chapters, Lingis is utterly honest. We share the agony of separation with 
him, and the incomprehensible pain of immeasurable suffering that he 
encounters on the streets of Calcutta. He does not adopt the courageous 
attitude of the nobel sufferer, those sensitive tourists who inevitably 
compare suffering to their luxury. He understands himself better than 
that, better than to think that the signs, the traces, he finds there are ready-
made for his Aristotelian understanding. Only through an understanding 
of the erotic foundations of the moral imperative, of the economics of the 
exchange of signs, of that which makes him an agent can Lingis approach 
another openly, erotically. 
I must admit to not understanding the effect of the last chapter. 
It works by the counterpunctual juxtaposition of first person narratives in 
which we encounter a number of people, with short descriptive paragraphs 
of Aristotelian and Kantian ethics. As in the previous chapters, we are 
asked to neither accept nor reject the philosophers in light of the narrative. 
Again, this would be too easy. Instead, it seems as if an awareness of the 
foundations of these moral imperatives and exchanges of goods and 
virtues in libidinal life is the goal. Like complicated images in a good film, 
the exegetical and narrative passages are merely set against one another 
and neither is allowed to dominate, or even respond. Lingis does not allow 
us to reject one or the other, perhaps since both are so skillfully written. 
The effect is unsettling and powerful, as it is throughout the book. 
A brief critical note: the book is shoddily proofread. 
Typographical errors plague almost every chapter making some crucial 
passages difficult to read. 
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Introduction to Logic and Critical Thinking, by Merrilee Salmon. 
Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, 1988. Reviewed by Marjorie Hass, 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
An introductory course in critical thinking is, for many 
undergraduates, a first encounter not only with the principles of clear and 
logical thought, but with philosophy in general. Given this, and the further 
observation that few students continue the study of philosophy, it becomes 
apparent that an introductory logic text must serve two purposes. 
Obviously the text must provide a clear guide to the fundamentals of logic 
but it ought also to present this material in as philosophical a context as 
possible, i.e., it must give students a sense of the relationship logic bears to 
the greater philosophical enterprise. 
On both of these counts An Introduction to Logic and Critical 
Thinking by Merrilee Salmon fares well. The material is rendered in a 
brisk cycle foregoing the breezy conversational tone adopted by many 
such books. Salmon's mood is a studious one that lends itself well to the 
rigors of the more formal aspects of logic, but its also appropriate for 
discussions of informal matters. She also avoids the common technique of 
sectioning off of "points to know" or "key terms". Instead each chapter is 
followed by a glossary and brief summary which allows the instructor to 
place the focus according to his or her own liking. 
In addition Salmon alludes to the philosophical context in which 
logic exists. She does not shy away from pointing out, for example, that 
there are serious questions about whether the material conditional can 
adequately render the "if-then" of an English sentence or that there exist 
criticisms of some of the very foundations of classical logic. For those who 
wish to include material of this nature in an introductory course, Salmon's 
book offers several nice points of departure. On the other hand, the 
philosophical content of the book is not belabored and can be largely 
ignored by instructors disinclined to teach it. 
The content of the book includes the requisite chapters on 
inductive and deductive arguments and fallacies. One nice switch is that 
the inductive material is presented first leaving students less likely to think 
of induction as the poor cousin to deduction. In addition, Salmon offers 
chapters on causal arguments, probability, scientific reasoning, syllogisms, 
and the role of language and definition in critical thinking. An appendix 
gives a proof method for truth-functional logic. Each chapter is relatively 
discrete allowing for a high degree of flexibility. There is quite a lot of 
material covered and I doubt that it could be completely gotten through in 
one semester. 
There are enough exercises to allow for some to be assigned as 
homework and some to be practiced in class. The examples are taken 
from contemporary sources such as newspapers and political speeches as 
well as from literature and even poetry. Unfortunately, few are taken from 
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philosophical writing. An answer key is provided for a small portion of the 
exercises, although students complained that the examples taken from 
literary sources were often hard to understand and that answers were 
provided for too few of the exercises. 
Overall, however, my students were enthusiastic about this 
textbook commenting that it did not talk down to them and that it was easy 
to read. They were able to master quite difficult material, including an 
introduction to Bayesian confirmation and some applications of truth-
functional logic to computing. I felt that much of their success in these 
areas was due to the clear presentation given by Salmon. 
I would recommend Introduction to Logic and Critical Thinking to 
those instructors who appreciate a flexible textbook and who ascribe, as I 
do, to the belief that a good textbook is one that knows its role-presenting 
material and then staying out of the way so that the instructor can focus 
and expand on the material according to her interests. 
The Dialectic of Biblical Critique: Interpretation and Existence. Brayton 
Polka. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. pp. x +191; cl. $25.00. Reviewed 
by Patrick M. O'Neil, State University of New York at Binghamton. 
Hermeneutics has become one of the liveliest areas of scholarly 
activity, and the work of intellectual giants such as Gadamer seriously 
threatens to make that discipline the very fulcrum of new philosophical 
investigations promising methods of interpretation capable of avoiding 
many of the logical culs-de-sac which have hampered more analytical 
approaches. 
The new hermeneutics has developed novel and exciting 
approaches to old philosophical conundra and helped to revivify the 
ancient wisdom of philosophy. In the shadow of the great modern 
hermeneuts, however, has arisen a tribe of mystagogues and myth-
mongers who have taken up the hermeneutical enterprise, but not with an 
eye to parting the veils of ignorance. 
Professor Polka looks to Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, and Kierkegaard as 
his mentors in this great biblical dialectic, and the comparison is not 
wholly inappropriate. Kierkegaard subscribed as the core of his 
philosophical theology to a mysticism which held in the end that the 
Divine superseded the laws of logic. Reality in its very ground of being did 
not necessarily conform to the laws of logic, including the law of 
contradiction. 
Spinoza and Hegel were deeply influenced by the heterodox 
tradition of the Kabala with its belief in a secret oral tradition which 
provided the key for the true understanding of the text, and with its special 
inverted uses of the law of contradiction. 
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In deciphering Polka, it is vital to appreciate that the core of his 
system (if I may so term it) rests in the contrasting of the Greek vision with 
the Hebrew reality—the pagan versus the biblical world view. 
The single greatest problem that engulfed Greek philosophy from 
its pre-Socratic roots to its Hellenistic denouement was not the irritating 
conundrum of the One and the Many nor the vexatious Third Man 
Argument with which the sophist Parmenides entangles the young 
Socrates of the Platonic dialogue, but the perplexing problem of "being 
and becoming." 
A good deal of the problem arose out of the misapplication of the 
law of contradiction, as one can well see in some of the Zenoistic 
paradoxes: Death is impossible because at any given moment you are 
either dead or you are alive. Therefore, when you die you either dead or 
you are alive. If you die when you are alive, that is an impossible 
contradiction, for you would be dead and alive at the same moment, but if 
you die when you are dead, that is redundant, and thus meaningless. 
These problems with the application of the law of contradiction to 
the processes of change led to things like the Parmenidean-Zenoist 
position that all movement and change are mere illusion. Contrasted to 
this, of course, was the Heraclitean doctrine that all was flux without stasis 
and the associated position of Cratylus that, on account of that hyperflux, 
reality could not be encompassed by words, thoughts, or logical formulae. 
Beyond this, most Greek thought was dualistic, although not so 
dualistic as gnosticism or Manichaeanism, its stepchildren, would become. 
Contrasted to the biblical version of crealio ex nihilo (by an omnipotent 
God), the Greek notions of the eternity of the universe and the origin of 
material nature in a pre-existing primal chaos led quite naturally to a 
dualism of matter and spirit. 
In addition, of course, Polka emphasizes all of the other dualities 
embedded in the Greek tradition, especially the duality of the self and the 
other. This duality was not only the opposition of the self to other selves, 
but also the opposition of the self to all else that exists. The vision in the 
portrait of the epic, comic, and tragic hero radically differs from that of the 
biblical universe where providence reigns. 
Providence insures that the other which resists the self is not truly 
an alien other, but the product of an intelligence proportionately 
analogous to that of the self, loving and protective of the self, and creative 
of the other and the self alike. 
So much is unexceptional, even standard interpretation, and it 
forms in irreducible base for the Polka hermeneutic. Nonetheless, one is 
left with the unavoidable feeling that much of Polka's writing is poetic 
prose defying a literal analysis. 
Kant and Satan dance with the Pre-Socratics, while Kierkegaard 
whispers with the Hebrew prophets against Orestes! The learning in this 
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volume seems most impressive, but the style is that of the most dizzying 
and impenetrable obscurantism. Consider a typical passage: 
The law of contradiction is indemonstrable. Indeed, the 
law of contradiction shows that demonstration is itself 
grounded or begins in the desire for or lack of 
demonstration. Satan reverses the law of contradiction 
by holding that, unlike Socrates, he is not ignorant or of 
[sic] blind to evil, for indeed he knows evil, for he is the 
very principle (principal) of evil, he holds. He 
demonstrates knowledge of evil as the first principle. 
In claiming to know (or to will) evil, consciously, 
Satan claims to know the thing in itself. Satanic spirit is 
conscious (or willful) paganism, idolatry, the diabolical 
fusion of the will of truth as its own standard with the 
pagan notion of the thing known either only in itself or 
only relative to others (each the mirror image of the 
other, as we have seen)—mat which Kant calls the thing 
in itself and Hegel immediacy. 
The bookjacket blurb ends with the tantalizing, 
claim/promise/challenge: "A true conception of text allows us to discern 
the common ground uniting all philosophical, religious, and literary 
works." 
This surely is the philosopher's stone of the alchemical/hermetic 
tradition, the secret knowledge of the Gnostics and the Kabala which 
reveal all other secrets. Such a key to all texts (at least as regards their 
common ground) would be a marvelous thing indeed, but the danger with 
a hermeneutics based on such a claim is that in the end it may prove to be 
no more than an excuse to indulge a penchant to philosophize in abstruse 
language using concepts from other theologies and philosophies in ways 
that wrench from their proper contexts and from their true internal 
coherencies. 
